University of Dayton Law Review
Volume 11

Number 2

Article 7

1-1-1986

First Amendment: Awarding Exclusive Cable Franchises through
Auction Process Violates the First Amendment Rights of Private
Cable Companies
Michael A. Metz
University of Dayton

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Metz, Michael A. (1986) "First Amendment: Awarding Exclusive Cable Franchises through Auction
Process Violates the First Amendment Rights of Private Cable Companies," University of Dayton Law
Review: Vol. 11: No. 2, Article 7.
Available at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss2/7

This Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at eCommons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in University of Dayton Law Review by an authorized editor of eCommons. For more
information, please contact mschlangen1@udayton.edu, ecommons@udayton.edu.

FIRST

AMENDMENT:

AWARDING

EXCLUSIVE

CABLE

FRANCHISES THROUGH AUCTION PROCESS VIOLATES THE FIRST

COMPANIES-Preferred
Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396
(9th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 380 (1985).

AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF PRIVATE CABLE

I.

INTRODUCTION

During the past two decades, a new form of telecasting has
emerged in the United States in the form of cable television'. While
cable television has undoubtedly increased the quantity of information
and entertainment available to the viewing public, the advent of cable
television has also spawned a variety of related legal problems and issues.' Among these problems and issues is the proper method for granting cable television companies, in a nondiscriminatory manner, the
right to telecast in a given area.' In the past, cable television companies
obtained a license from a political subdivision of the4 state in order to
provide cable television service to a particular locale. New cable companies must now have a franchise in order to provide cable service
within the United States.' In most localities, the city governments, acting as franchising authorities,6 grant exclusive franchises to cable teleI. Cable television refers to systems capable of re-transmitting television broadcast signals
and also "transmitting a variety of programming from non-broadcast sources made possible by
satellite delivery systems as well as programming originated in their own studios." Berkshire
Cablevision v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 979 n.1 (D.R.I. 1983). In comparison to cable television,
"'CATV', or 'community antenna television', refers to systems that receive television broadcast
signals and transmit them by wire to subscribers." Id.
2. See, e.g., Fornightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968) (cable
companies that rebroadcast a local television station's programs may infringe on copyright laws);
Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 987 (D. Utah 1982) (state law makes distribution of pornographic material over cable a misdemeanor).
3. See, e.g., Tele-Communications of Key West, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330 (D.C.
serCir. 1985). In Tele-Communications, the U.S. Air Force requested bids for cable television
vice to Homestead Air Force Base in Florida. Id. at 1332.
4. See Hopkinsville Cable TV, Inc. v. Pennyroyal Cablevision, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 543, 545
(W.D. Ky. 1982).
5. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (currently codified at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 521-559 (West Supp. 1984)). Section 541(b)(1) of the Act
provides: "Except to the extent provided in paragraph (2), a cable operator may not provide cable
service without a franchise." 47 U.S.C.A. § 541(b)(1) (West Supp. 1985). Paragraph 2 provides:
"Paragraph (1) shall not require any person lawfully providing cable service without a franchise
on July i, 1984, to obtain a franchise unless the franchising authority so requires." Id. §
541(b)(2).
6. 47 U.S.C.A. § 522(9) (West Supp. 1985). "Franchising authority" is broadly defined as
"any governmental entity empowered by Federal, State or local law to grant a franchise." Id.

Published by eCommons, 1985

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 11:2

vision companies through a bidding process." For example, the city of
Los Angeles, California, adheres to an auction process which requires a
participant to pay a ten thousand dollar filing fee and demonstrate that
its business is on a sound financial basis.8 This auction process was
challenged in Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,'
wherein the United State Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit confronted the issue of whether the city of Los Angeles, consistent with the
first amendment to the United States Constitution, could limit access to
public utility facilities10 to one cable television company when the facilities were capable of accommodating more than one company's cable
attachments. 1 The court held that Los Angeles could not limit access
to an exclusive franchise because to do so would be violative of the first
amendment's freedom of expression protections." The court also ruled,
however, that the city enjoyed antitrust immunity with respect to the
regulation of cable television, and therefore could not be held liable for
damages arising from the anticompetitive effects of the city's first
amendment violation.' As a result, the Ninth Circuit did not require
Los Angeles to pay Preferred Communications any damages. Instead,
Los Angeles was only required to remedy its first amendment violation
by structuring a new auction process that would award cable franchises
without violating a participant's right to freedom of expression.' 4
This casenote will initially analyze the rationale used by the Ninth
Circuit in determining that the award of an exclusive cable television
franchise violated the first amendment. The analysis will then specifically focus on the court's determination that a cable franchising auction process is not content neutral 6 and consequently violates an applicant's freedom of expression. Finally, this note will examine the court's
treatment of the antitrust issue and whether its recognition of state action immunity wasr proper in this instance.

7. Middleton, Cable TV Franchise Violates First Amendment, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 18, 1985, at
8, col. I.
8. Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir.),
cert. granted. 106 S. Ct. 380 (1985).
9. 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 380 (1985).
10. Public utility facilities specifically refer to poles and conduits owned by utility companies. Id. at 1400.
II. Id. at 1411.
12. Id. at 1410-11.
13. Id. at 1415.
14. See id. at 1411.
15. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). A regulation is non-content
neutral if it restricts expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.
Id. at 95.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss2/7

CASENOTES

1986]
II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Preferred Communications was organized for the purpose of operating cable television systems in the southern half of the city of Los
Angeles. 6 Needing a method to supply customers with cable services,
Preferred Communications approached two utility companies and attempted to negotiate a lease that would give it the right to attach its
7
cables to the utility companies' poles and conduits.' Both utility companies denied Preferred Communications' request, informing the cable
company that Los Angeles required all cable companies to obtain a
franchise from the city before the cable companies would be permitted
to attach cables to public utility facilities located within the city.'" Subsequently, Preferred Communications petitioned the city of Los Angeles for a franchise. 9
The city of Los Angeles refused to grant Preferred Communications a franchise because the company had not participated in the city's
auction process.2 0 Preferred Communications subsequently brought an

action in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California, challenging the city's policies governing the auctioning of a
solitary right to provide cable services in different regions of Los Angeles. 2 ' The district court dismissed Preferred Communications' constitutional claim because, as a matter of law, the city's auction process did
not violate the first amendment rights of a prospective cable television
operator. 22 In addition, the court held that the city was immune from
antitrust liability.23 The cable company appealed this decision to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that Los
Angeles' procedure for awarding cable franchises violated the first
amendment, 2 ' and that Los Angeles was not immune from Sherman

(9th
16. Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1399-1400
(1985).
380
Ct.
S.
106
granted,
Cir.), cert.
17. Id. at 1400.
com18. Id. The city of Los Angeles is statutorily authorized to enfranchise cable television
541(b),(e)
§
U.S.C.A
47
also
See
1984).
Supp.
(West
panies. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53066
before
(West Supp. 1985). The United States Code requires cable operators to have franchises
541(b)(1).
§
id.
See
public.
general
the
to
they can provide cable television service
19. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1400.
20. Id. In order to participate in Los Angeles' auction process, a cable operator must submit
of future
to numerous conditions. First, the operator must agree to pay Los Angeles a percentage
use.
city's
the
for
channels
various
provide
must
operator
the
Second,
annual gross revenues. Id.
Id. at
Id. Third, the bidder must allow city officials to set prices and handle customer relations.
in deciding
1401. These three requirements, in addition to several other requirements, aid the city
which operator is best qualified for each region of the city. Id.
21. Id. at 1399.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1401.
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Act antitrust liability under the state action exemption.15
In the original opinion of March 1, 1985, the Ninth Circuit held
that the first amendment prohibited the city from limiting access to
public utility poles and conduits to a single cable television company,
particularly when the utilities' facilities were capable of accommodating more than one cable television system.2 6 In its amended opinion of
May 20, 1985, the court added that Los Angeles' method of awarding
franchises violated the first amendment because the method created a
risk that city officials might discriminate among bidders on the basis of
their proposed programming content.27 The city, however, was not liable for damages as a consequence of the anticompetitive effects of its
first amendment violation because the court also held that Los Angeles
enjoyed antitrust immunity. 8

III.

BACKGROUND

Before the advent of television, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) committed most of its efforts to regulating radio broadcasting.2 9 In 1934, Congress passed the Communications Act of 1934,30
giving the FCC the authority to regulate broadcast television. The
Communications Act of 1934 was promulgated because of the finite
size of the electromagnetic spectrum; 1 regulation of broadcast television has continued for this reason. 2 Although the FCC kept a watchful
25. Id. at 1399 (the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision as it pertained to
Preferred Communications' antitrust claims but reversed the district court's dismissal of Preferred
Communications' first amendment claim). See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943)
("nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history ... suggests that its purpose was
to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature"). This immunity from liability under the Sherman Act is called the state action exemption.
26. Preferred Communications,754 F.2d at 1411. As indicated, the Ninth Circuit set forth
an opinion that was subsequently amended by two orders. See Preferred Communications, No.
84-5541 (9th Cir. June 26, 1985) (order amending opinion) (on file with University of Dayton
Law Review); Preferred Communications, No. 84-5541 (9th Cir. June 13, 1985) (order amending
opinion) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review). See also Preferred Communications,
754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985) (original opinion) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
27. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1406.
28. Id. at 1396.
29. See Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (codified at 47
U.S.C. §§ 81-115 (1982)), repealed by Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48
Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1982)).
30. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C.
99 151-609 (1982)).
31. "[The] electromagnetic spectrum [is] the entire range of wavelengths or frequencies of
electromagnetic radiation from the shortest gamma rays to the longest radio waves, visible light
comprising only a small part of the range." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 732 (17th ed. 1976).
32. See Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 579 F. Supp. 1553, 1563 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
(the rationale regarding the physical scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum is recognized as the
"physical scarcity rationale").
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eye on broadcast television because of the scarcity of broadcast chans
nels, cable television was not subject to direct regulation until 1962."
Due to the competitive impact of cable television, the FCC abandoned
its "hands-off" policy"4 by imposing two requirements: First, it required
cable operators to carry the signals of local broadcasters in service
areas where the cable operators brought competing signals; second, the
cable operators were forbidden to duplicate programming of local sta5
tions for periods of fifteen days before and after a local broadcast."
In 1968, the FCC further expanded its regulation of cable television by proposing additional rules that required cable companies to af36
firmatively advance statutory policies. The reason for this expansion
in the scope of regulation was twofold: (1) cable television was having
37
an adverse impact on broadcast television, and (2) there was a sub-

33. See Berkshire Cablevision v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983). The Berkshire
Cablevision court gave a lengthy discourse on the history of cable television regulation:
Until the early 1960's, the Commission had concluded that it lacked authority to regulate
cable television. It had reasoned that cable operators were neither "broadcasters" nor
"common carriers" within the meaning of the [Communications] Act [of 1934].
[However, in 1962, the FCC] found that some regulation was necessary to ameliorate
the competitive impact of cable television on local broadcast television. The [FCC] imposed
two separate requirements on cable television operators. First, they were required to carry
the signals of local broadcast stations in service areas in which they bought competing
signals. . . . Second, cable operators were forbidden to duplicate the programming of such
local stations for periods of 15 days before and after a local broadcast.
Id. at 983 n.5 (citations omitted).
34. Id. at 983 n.5. See also Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied. 434 U.S. 829 (1977), where the court noted that the United States Supreme Court had
recognized the FCC's authority to regulate cable television. Id. at 13 (citing United States v.
Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 667-68 (1972); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,
392 U.S. 157, 173-76 (1968)).
35. See First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 716-30 (1965). See generally Berkshire
Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 983 n.5.
36. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417, 422
(1968) (FCC's general position of regulation in order to prevent cable television companies from
harming local broadcasters). In providing for the allocation of communication facilities, the FCC
is required to "make such distribution of licenses, frequencies, hours of operation, and of power
among the several States and communities as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution
of radio service to each of the same." 47 U.S.C.A. § 307(b) (West 1982).
The Commission also promulgated local origination rules requiring cable companies to make
available facilities for local production. See Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 983 n.5.
37. See Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968). The court in Black
Hills Video Corp. observed:
[M]ultiple channel CATV service would impair the existence and development of local
television stations by splintering the audience of such stations . . . . Without . . . local
stations, many viewers who could not afford CATV charges . . . would be deprived of
television service. Such a result would be contrary to the public interest. Protection of
public interest in the television field is clearly a responsibility of the Commission under the
Federal Communications Act.
id. at 71.

Published by eCommons, 1985

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 1 1:2

stantial public interest to consider." The regulations expanded the
FCC's regulatory power beyond that which it had previously enjoyed.
To be valid, however, the regulations had to meet one of two tests.39
The ends to be achieved by the regulations had to be (1) "well understood and consistently held ends for which broadcast television could be
regulated, ' 40 or (2) Congress must have approved of the FCC
regulations.4"
Because the aforementioned requirements apply to all forms of television, it follows that the FCC regulates cable television for some of
the same reasons that it regulates broadcast television.42 For example,
the Supreme Court has recognized that the FCC can regulate broadcast television because of the physical scarcity of the electromagnetic
spectrum. 4s The FCC has also claimed that cable television regulations
are valid because of the physical scarcity of cable attachments on public utility facilities,4 4 a position that has been accepted by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.4 Thus, one of the rationales used to support the regulation of broadcast television has also
been used to support the regulation of cable television.
When courts uphold cable regulations, they not only accept rationales that support the regulation of broadcast television, but they also
rely on new theories of justification.4 6 For instance, governmental regulation of cable television has been justified using an economic approach.
Some courts have recognized that cable television is a natural monopoly 4l and have held that competition for cable services is not economically feasible. 46 Although the United States Supreme Court has re38. See supra note 33. It is in the public's interest to have the FCC develop an adequate
system of local television. See Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 983 n.5.
39. Home Box Office, Inc., 567 F.2d at 26-28.
40. Id. at 28.
41. See United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 667-68 (1972).
42. See, e.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.
1981) (regulation promotes diverse state-of-the-art communication services); Black Hills Video
Corp.. 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968) (regulation protects interstate commerce); Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983) (time, place, and manner regulation of expression).
43. See National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 190.
44. See. e.g.. Century Fed., 579 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
45. Black Hills Video Corp., 399 F.2d at 69. See also Preferred Communications, Inc. v.
City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir.) (citing Black Hills Video Corp, 399 F.2d at
69), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 380 (1985).
46. Public disruption is another theory relied on by courts to regulate cable television. See
Preferred Communication, 754 F.2d at 1405.
47. See, e.g., Lamb v. Toledo Blade, 461 F.2d 506, 513 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1001 (1972) ("[The parties] were competing in a natural monopoly situation in which two or
more [cable television] operators could not survive in direct house-to-house competition.").
48. See Community Communications Co., 660 F.2d at 1379 ("The conclusion that [CATV
systems are] natural monopol[ies] is a justification for some degree of regulation of cable operators ....
"). See also Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 986 (because most cable companies
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jected this theory as a justification for the regulation of other media,
such as newspapers,4 several lower federal courts have held that the
inherent monopolistic character of cable companies allows for governmental regulation."
Interestingly, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit apparently abandoned the use of the inherent monopoly
theory in adjudicating Preferred Communications' complaint. Instead,
the court relied on the first amendment to abrogate Los Angeles' regulatory auction process in Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of
Los Angeles. 1

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Application of the First Amendment to Cable Franchising

1. Los Angeles' Auction Process for Awarding Exclusive Cable
Franchises is Unconstitutional
In analyzing the first amendment issues surrounding the franchising process, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
5
in Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, ' initially
observed that the standards of review for regulation of cable and
58
broadcast television are different. Following the lead of the United
States Supreme Court," the Ninth Circuit recognized that because of
the physical scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum, regulation of
broadcasting frequencies does not violate the first amendment right of
free expression when balanced against the public's interest in the airways.'5 The court, however, rejected the idea that the physical scarcity
have natural monopolies, start-up costs and economic conditions make entry into the cable television market difficult). The rationale used by the courts is referred to as the economic scarcity
theory.
49. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
50. See, e.g.. Omega Satellite Prods. Co., 694 F.2d at 127-28; Community Communications Co., 660 F.2d at 1379; Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 985-86.
51. 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 380 (1985).
52. 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 380 (1985).
53. Id. at 1403. See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1964)
("[D]ifferences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment
standards applied to them.").
54. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co., the Court stated: In view of the scarcity of broadcast
frequencies, the Government's role in allocating those frequencies, and the legitimate claims of
those unable without governmental assistance to gain access to those frequencies for expression of
their views, we hold the [governmental] regulations . . . are . . . authorized by statute and [are
therefore] constitutional." 395 U.S. at 400-01. See also National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
55. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1404 ("Without licensing, the broadcast spectrum would be rendered virtually useless to all."). See also Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo
Alto, 579 F. Supp. 1553, 1563 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (recognizing that the electromagnetic spectrum
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rationale also applied to cable television in this case because space on
the utilities' poles was not limited.5 Therefore, because adequate facilities were available to support more than one cable company's equipment, 67 Los Angeles was not allowed to restrict the operation of a cable
system in a particular region of the city to an exclusive cable
company."
Although the Ninth Circuit refused to give effect to Los Angeles'
regulatory auction process, the court did recognize that the city had an
interest in regulating cable television." The court noted that when
cable companies attach cables to utility poles, sections of public streets
are closed to the general public. 0 This activity causes public disruption
that the city has a responsibility and a right to minimize in order to
protect public resources." However, the court held that the city's interest in minimizing public disruption was not important enough to regulate expression. 62 The auction process simply did not further a substantial interest that justified the resulting limitation on cable companies'

is a finite medium incapable of carrying the messages of all who wish to use it).
56. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1404. The Ninth Circuit stated:
We cannot accept the City's contention that, because the available space on such facilities
is to an undetermined extent physically limited, the First Amendment standards applicable
to the regulation of broadcasting permit it to restrict access and allow only a single cable
provider to install and operate a cable television system.
Id. See also Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 45 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977) ("[A]n essential precondition of [broadcast regulation] theory-physical interference and
scarcity requiring an umpiring role for government-is absent [with cable television].").
57. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1404 ("[Tlhe physical scarcity that could justify increased regulation of cable operations does not exist in this case.").
58. Id. at 1411. In considering the court's holding, it is noteworthy that all cable companies
are allowed access to public utility facilities according to California law. See CAL. PuB. UlIL
CODE § 767.5(b) (West Supp. 1986). Section 767.5(b) of the California Public Utility Code
states:

The Legislature finds and declares that public utilities have dedicated a portion of
such support structures to cable television corporations for pole attachments in that public
utilities have made available, through a course of conduct covering many years, surplus
space and excess capacity on and in their support structures for use by cable television
corporations for pole attachments, and that the provision by such public utilities of surplus
space and excess capacity for such pole attachments is a public utility service delivered by
public utilities to cable television corporations.
The Legislature further finds and declares that it is in the interests of the people of
California for public utilities to continue to make available such surplus space and excess
capacity for use by cable television corporations.
Id.
59. See Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1406.
60. See id. (citing Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370,
1377 (10th Cir. 1981) ("[A] cable operator must lay the means of his medium underground or
string it across poles in order to deliver his message. Obviously, this manner of using the public
domain entails significant disruption, especially to streets, alleys, and other public ways.")).
61. See Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1406.
62. Id. at 1406-07.
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exercise of editorial control and judgment.63 Because the auction process did not promote a substantial interest that complied with the Supreme Court's standard" for upholding governmental regulations,"
Los Angeles could not intrude on Preferred Communications' first
amendment right to freedom of expression."
2. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Precisely Confront the Facts
Presented in Preferred Communications
When the Ninth Circuit amended its Preferred Communications
opinion, it added two extremely significant sentences to its original
opinion: 7
But the means chosen by the City to serve its interests-allowing only
the single company selected through the franchise auction process to
erect and operate a cable system in each region-creates a serious risk
that city officials will discriminate among cable providers on the basis of
the content of, or the views expressed in, their proposed programs. This
risk can be reduced, if not eliminated, by means less destructive of First
Amendment rights."
The addition of these sentences is very troubling. The court implied
that the regulations governing the franchise selection process were not
content neutral or at least they would not be applied in a content-neutral fashion. This implication indicates that the Ninth Circuit believed
it was confronted with a regulation that specifically infringed on the
editorial viewpoints 9 of Preferred Communications. The Ninth Circuit,
however, claimed that the issue in Preferred Communications focused
on whether limited access to utility poles for cable attachments ex-

63. Id.
64. In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Supreme Court articulated the
following standard for analyzing regulations affecting first amendment expression:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of
the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 377.
65. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1404-05.
66. Id. at 1411.
67. Before the first amended opinion of Preferred Communications was finished, at least
one court had already commented on the Preferred Communications pre-amended decision. See
Tele-Communications of Key West, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330, 1338 n.3 (D.C. Cir.
1985) ("The precise basis for the Ninth Circuit's opinion [inPreferredCommunications] is unclear .... ").See also supra note 26.
68. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1406.
69. A broadcasted editorial viewpoint of an entity like Preferred Communications would
appear to be analogous to a spoken message of an individual for purposes of the right to freedom
of expression under the first amendment to the United States Constitution.
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isted-that is, whether there was a scarcity in utility facilities that justified Los Angeles' discriminatory auction process.7 0 As the court noted
71
in its subheading, this issue involves the cable television medium.
Thus, the issue presented emphasizes the means or medium of transporting the communication, not the message or views of the cable company. The court, for some reason, felt compelled to address the latter
issue.
Despite the differences between medium and views, the Ninth Circuit did not adequately distinguish between the regulation of access to
utility poles-medium-and the regulation of expression-views. The
court rather carelessly categorized medium and views as one-in-thesame. The Ninth Circuit may have rationalized this categorization because nearly all regulations that are non-content neutral are per se violations of the first amendment right of free expression.72 The court's
rationalization, however, ignores the fact that lower federal courts need
unambiguous precedent when confronted with complicated issues that
are similar to those the Ninth Circuit confronted in Preferred
73
Communications.
The Ninth Circuit should have noted that the propriety of access
regulations and the legitimacy of viewpoint regulations are analyzed
under differing standards. Government regulation of the dissemination
of an individual's viewpoints must withstand strict scrutiny; the regulation must be narrowly drawn to further a compelling state interest.7 4
To the contrary, when a local government regulates access to communicative mediums, it need only prove that it has an important interest
in regulating such access and that the incidental restriction on alleged
first amendment rights is not greater than that which is essential to the

70. See Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1401. The court stated:
We believe such an issue is as follows:
Can the City, consistent with the First Amendment, limit access by means of an auction process to a given region of the City to a single cable television company, when the
public utility facilities and other public property in that region necessary to the installation
and operation of a cable television system are physically capable of accommodating more
than one system?

Id.
71. Id. at 1403 ("B. The Cable Television Medium and the First Amendment").
72. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) ("Our cases have required the most
exacting scrutiny in cases in which a state undertakes to regulate speech on the basis of its content."). See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971) ("[Tlhe State certainly lacks power
to punish [citizens] for the underlying content of the[ir] message[s] .... ).
73. For example, the United States District Court for the Central District of California
would not know which provisions of the auction process were invalid because the Ninth Circuit did
"not decide the validity of any specific requirements called for by the City's franchising process."
Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1401
74. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270.
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78
furtherance of the important governmental interest. If the proffered
governmental interests, such as avoiding public disruption and preventing physical scarcity of public utility pole space, are of the requisite
"importance," then the "regulation of access" is allowed to be more
intrusive upon first amendment rights than "regulation of views," and a
7
city may be warranted in restricting access of a cable system. Consequently, the courts must explicitly distinguish between cases where a
local goverment engages in the regulation of viewpoints from those situations where the government regulation is merely restricting access to
a particular type of medium. The Ninth Circuit's analysis in Preferred
Communications failed to make this important distinction.

B.

Antitrust Liability

1. Los Angeles is Immune from Antitrust Liability
The second issue raised in Preferred Communications was the lia77
bility of Los Angeles for an alleged antitrust violation. The Los Angeles auction process was found to grant the city monopolistic power over
cable systems.78 When incorporated government entities, such as the
city of Los Angeles, 7 attempt to monopolize, they are literally subject
80
to the antitrust proscriptions of the Sherman Act. Nevertheless, immunity from the Sherman Act has been accorded government entities
in certain circumstances.8 1 For instance, states acting in their sovereign
83
capacity 2 are immune from liability under the Sherman Act. This
immunity, however, is restricted when applied to local government entities; 84 political subdivisions of the state do not automatically share the

75. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77.
76. See Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1404-06.
77. Id. at 1401.
78. See id. at 1405, 1412.
79. The city of Los Angeles is a municipal corporation. Id. at 1396.
80. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (West Supp. 1985). Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporaSee also City of Lafayette
Id.
I..."
tion, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars .
are, with some exceptions,
(cities
(1978)
n.14
397
389,
U.S.
435
Co.,
Light
&
Power
v. Louisiana
subject to antitrust laws).
81. See, e.g.. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (state regulation of raisin crop nonviolative of Sherman Act).
82. "The governments of the states are sovereign within their territory save only as they are
subject to the prohibitions of the Constitution or as their action in some measure conflicts with
powers delegated to the National Government, or with Congressional. legislation enacted in the
exercise of those powers." Id. at 359-60.
83. Id. at 350-51. See Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1411 ("States, acting 'as
sovereigns,' are immune from liability under the Sherman Act.").
84. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1411.
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state's immunity. 5 Instead, a city like Los Angeles must act, when displacing competition, pursuant to a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy." 8 Moreover, the state must actively supervise the municipality's anticompetitive conduct when the
municipality delegates the state-authorized power to private parties.17
In determining whether Los Angeles' actions were pursuant to a
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy," the
Ninth
Circuit scrutinized the city's actions under a two-part test. First, because the city's actions were allegedly displacing competition in the
provision of cable services, the court had to determine whether the
state policy allowed such displacement of competition with regulation
or monopolization of public cable television services.88 Second, the
court had to analyze whether the state legislature contemplated the
kinds of actions alleged to be anticompetitive.8 9 The Ninth Circuit determined that the first part of the test was sufficiently met because the
legislature had, by statute, granted Los Angeles the authority to regulate cable systems by allowing cities to grant licenses or franchises.90
The second part of the antitrust immunity test was also satisfied because in the court's opinion the legislature had to have foreseen the
specific anticompetive action taken by Los Angeles-"a reasonable
consequence of [the city's] engaging in the authorized regulatory activity."9 1 Because the two parts of the test were satisfied, the court recognized that the city correctly acted under a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy" which, consequently, resulted in
9
antitrust immunity.
The conclusion of the court is substantively correct; a governmental agent of the state should not be restrained by the Sherman Act's

85. Id. "[Flor purposes of the Parker doctrine, not every act of a state agency is that of the
State as sovereign." City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410 (citing Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 790 (1975)). The Supreme Court confirmed the validity of the reasoning of City of
Lafayette in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 51 n.14 (1982).
86. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980). "[Tlwo standards [must be met] for antitrust immunity under Parker v. Brown. First, the
challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy';
second, the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the State itself." Id. at 105 (quoting City of
Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410). See also Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1411 (quoting City
of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410).
87. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n, 455 U.S. at 105-06. But see Town of Hallie v.
City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713, 1720-21 (1985) (active state supervision component need not
be met when municipality is the actor). See infra text accompanying note 109.
88. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1412.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1412-14. See also CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53066 (West Supp. 1986) (reproduced at

infra note 104).
91.

Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1414-15.

92.

Id. at 1415.
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antitrust prohibitions when the agent's activities are directed by the
legislature. 8 The Ninth Circuit, however, did not need to meticulously
proceed through its two-part test to determine that Los Angeles acted
under a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy."
Instead, the court should have invoked the one-step test as presented by
the United States Supreme Court in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire."
2. The Town of Hallie test
After the original opinion of Preferred Communications was issued by the Ninth Circuit, the United States Supreme Court decided
Town of Hallie." In Town of Hallie, the city of Eau Claire, Wisconsin, acquired a monopoly over sewage treatment services" and refused
to provide service to four neighboring townships.'1 Instead, Eau Claire
supplied services to individual landowners in a given area after a majority of the landowners voted to have their homes annexed by the
city.9 The plaintiffs claimed that Eau Claire used its authorized monopoly to gain an unlawful monopoly over sewage collection and transportation services."
The plaintiffs' contention forced the Supreme Court to confront an
important question: How clearly must a state policy be articulated for a
municipality to establish that its anticompetitive activity is pursuant to
a state mandate, thus giving rise to antitrust immunity?co The Supreme Court held that the Wisconsin legislature was not required to
assert explicitly that it expected Eau Claire's conduct to have anticompetitive effects in order for the city's activities to be protected under the
umbrella of state action.101 Instead, it was sufficient that Eau Claire
had been given a grant of regulatory authority and that the anticompetitive effects logically resulted from this broad regulatory authorization.102 Because the legislative grant of a monopoly over construction of
a sewage system and the provision of such services in designated areas
93. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-51.
94. 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985).
95. The original Preferred Communications opinion was published on March 1, 1985. See
supra note 26 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court decided Town of Hallie on March 27,
1985. Town of Hallie, 105 S. Ct. at 1713.

96. Id. at 1715. The city had previously obtained federal funds to build a sewage treatment
facility within the area including the petitioning towns of Hallie, Seymour, Union, and Washington. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1715-16. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 144.07(1) (West 1974).
99. Town of Hallie, 105 S. Ct. at 1716.
100. Id. at 1717.
101. Id. at 1718.
102. Id.

Published by eCommons, 1985

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 1 1:2

satisfied the clear articulation test, the city's attempts to monopolize
sewage collection and transportation were immune from antitrust action as they were the logical anticompetitive consequence of the state's
grant of authority. Accordingly, Eau Claire's conduct met the requirements of the state action test and, therefore, immunized the city from
108
antitrust liability.
The facts in Preferred Communications are analogous to those in
Town of Hallie. Just as Eau Claire was given legislative authorization
to construct sewage systems and provide the related services, Los Angeles was given broad authority to control the construction of cable systems and the provision of cable services.' 04 Acting pursuant to the statute, Los Angeles formed an auction process to choose cable companies
for exclusive cable franchises. 0 5 As noted, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the Los Angeles auction process created a monopoly.106 The
court should also have recognized that the monopoly was a logical anticompetitive effect of Los Angeles' broad regulatory authorization. 7
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit should have carefully compared the facts
of the two cases and followed Town of Hallie to hold that Los Angeles
enjoyed antitrust immunity.
Ironically, the Ninth Circuit cited Town of Hallie in its amended
opinion. 08s The court recognized that the Supreme Court does not require states to "actively supervise" policies authorizing anticompetitive
conduct by its municipalities when a municipality, rather than a private
party, is the actor. 0 9 The Ninth Circuit, however, failed to properly
utilize Town of Hallie as a one-step test to determine that Los Angeles
acted under a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy." Instead, the court adhered to its two-step test and set a cumbersome precedent for future cases.
It will be particularly burdensome for a court to apply the first
part of the Ninth Circuit's test. Normally, courts do not specifically

103.

Id. at 1718-19.

104. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53066 (West 1983). Section 53066 provides:
Any city . . . in the State of California may, pursuant to such provisions as may be

prescribed by its governing body, authorize by franchise or license the construction of a
community antenna television system. In connection therewith, the governing body may
prescribe such rules and regulations as it deems advisable to protect the individual subscribers to the services of such community antenna television system.
Id.
105.
106.
107.
102-03.
108.
1718-19).
109.

Preferred Communications. 754 F.2d at 1400-01.
Id. at 1405, 1412
See Town of Hallie 105 S. Ct. at 1718. See also supra text accompanying notes
Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1414 (citing Town of Hallie, 105 S. Ct. at
Id. at 1412. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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determine the ambit of a legislative policy if the boundaries of the policy's reach are not defined.110 Under the first part of the test, however,
the court examines a state policy and determines if the legislature desired the displacement of competition even though this intention was
not specifically mentioned. To make this determination, the court will
have to delve unnecessarily into legislative history and hypothesize
about the ramifications of state legislative policy.
The second part of the test will burden the political subdivision
rather than the courts. The political subdivision must prove to the court
that the legislature contemplated the anticompetitive effects of the legislature's grant of rule-making authority. Part of the political subdivision's proof will include showing that the effects of its actions are a
reasonable consequence of the political subdivision's involvement in the
"
authorized regulatory activity. ' Thus, the political subdivision must
show the existence of a substantial reason for limiting competition; the
complaining party is not required to prove that the alleged anticompetitive effects of the political subdivision's actions are an unreasonable
consequence of the subdivision's involvement in the authorized regulatory activity. For example, a substantial reason for Los Angeles to limit
access to utility resources would be "to minimize disruption of public
resources." '12 This puts a significant evidentiary burden on the state's
political subdivision and ignores the existence of an adequate one-step
test developed by the Supreme Court in Town of Hallie which merely
requires that there be a grant of legislative authority that logically re11 3
sults in the subsequent anticompetitive effects.
V.

CONCLUSION

114
In Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to allow
a franchising authority to limit access to public utility facilities to an
of
exclusive cable television company when the facilities were capable
1 5 The
accommodating more than one company's cable attachments.

("A legis110. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 844 (1978)
but the
action
legislative
impelling
reasons
the
declare
may
lature appropriately inquires into and
within the
judicial function commands analysis of whether the specific conduct charged falls
[specified] reach of the statute ....").
cities, to miniII1. See, e.g.. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1415 ("That some
seems to us to
providers
cable
of
number
the
limit
might
resources,
mize the disruption of public
regulatory
constitute at least a reasonable consequence of their engaging in the authorized
activity.").
112. Id.
113. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
114. 754 F.2d 1396 (1985).
115. Id. at 1411. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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court concluded that the franchising authority's scheme of exclusivity-an auction process awarding the franchise to one applicant-violated the applicant cable company's freedom of expression as
guaranteed by the first amendment.11 The ramifications of this holding, however, should not be far reaching as the court did not indicate
what parts of the auction process were unconstitutional. Specifically,
the court did not state whether the process was meant to regulate the
content of the broadcasting or merely the medium by which the broadcast was conveyed. Because the Ninth Circuit was not specific in its
application of first amendment principles to the facts in this case,
courts that confront similar issues with cable television regulation in
the future will be unable to use the Ninth Circuit's opinion for guidance or as supportive precedent.117
The Ninth Circuit also failed to provide a promising precedent in
deciding the antitrust issue. First, the court invoked a cumbersome
two-part test which (a) directs courts to speculate about the legislature's intent behind state policies, and (b) requires political subdivisions
to prove that the means used to implement the grant of regulatory authority were contemplated by the state legislature. Second, the court
failed to utilize properly Supreme Court guidance in analyzing the antitrust issue; the Ninth Circuit did not draw upon the test expressed in,
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,1 18 whereby a court need only

determine that the anticompetitive means chosen logically proceed
from a legislative grant of authority. Therefore, it is highly unlikely
that Preferred Communications will stand as convincing precedent in
this evolving area of communications law.
Michael A. Metz

116. Id.
117. The usefulness of the Ninth Circuit's opinion may soon become a moot topic. On November 12, 1985. the United States Supreme Court granted review of defendant Los Angeles'
petition for certiorari. Preferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. 380 (1985). Although the Ninth
Circuit addressed two issues in Preferred Communications, Los Angeles has only sought review of
the Ninth Circuit's decision on the first amendment issue. Telephone interview with Siegfreid
Hesse, of Farrow, Schildhouse & Rains, Oakland, Cal., Preferred Communications' attorney
(Feb. 18, 1986).
It is impossible to accurately predict the direction the Court will take when it addresses the
first amendment issue. Because the decision by the Ninth Circuit was decided on the parties'
pleadings, the Court lacks a record on which it may base its decision. Id. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has received numerous amicus curiae briefs, which have adversely impacted the clarity of the issue. Id.
118. 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985).
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